This product is sold unpainted.

Additional Images.

1. The Battle of Motien, Manchuria, 1904. A demonstration game held at the Battleground Show.  the Japanese infantry in the background attack strongly held Russian defences. 

2-4. These lovely figures, vehicles and buildings are from the hand of Greg Potter. Greg has some fantastic ideas for his wargaming table which I very much admire. On this occasion he has recreated the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. The tanks and buildings are scratch built and the Jacklex Japanese infantry and MG are painted up as Chinese as well as Japanese forces. I love the old school feel of the whole thing. Thank you Greg.

ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL

Battalion: Command and control at company and battalion level was predominantly verbal. Russian officers used whistles, Japanese units used a system of runners but in essence orders and communications was passed in the traditional manner.   

Regiment/Division/Army.  Russian infantry and cavalry regiments were issued with four field telephones and 6km of wire. Japanese forces had telephone units at army and divisional level which could be allocated as required by the operational and tactical situation. There was some use of heliographs and signal lamps as well as a semaphore network adapted from the Russian Imperial Navy system.   

Artillery Co-operation. Japanese artillery observers were attached to front line units in the attack along with a telephone unit which would lay wire as it advanced. It allowed close co-operation between infantry and artillery in real time. Signal flags, visible at 1,800 with field glasses) were used by artillery batteries. At Port Arthur the Japanese used a map grid system and field telephone network to call down immediate fire on predetermined targets.

THE WARGAMER. Passage of orders is not always something that is considered in games and it can be quite difficult to simulate effectively. However, the two elements that might be considered in any Russo-Japanese War game are:

1. Speed of reaction and accuracy of indirect artillery fire if signal flags or telephone communication are available.     

2. Speed and timing of the committal of reserves in reaction to battlefield events if headquarters are linked by telephone, semaphore or signal flags.